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DEFINING INVESTOR CONFIDENCE: 
AVOIDING INTERPRETIVE UNCERTAINTY 
IN CHEVRON CORP. v. ECUADOR 
Jason Burke* 
Abstract: In an increasingly globalized world, foreign direct investment is 
becoming an incredibly important tool for investors in developed nations 
and the developed nations in which they are investing. Investors have in-
creasingly been seeking protections for their investments in foreign na-
tions. This is why approximately 2400 bilateral investment treaties were 
signed between various nations between 1994 and 2006. When conflicts 
arise, the job of interpreting these treaties often falls to investment arbi-
tration tribunals. Indeed, in 2010, an arbitration tribunal (Tribunal) op-
erating under the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) rules adjudicated a dispute between Chevron and the 
Republic of Ecuador (Ecuador) and interpreted the bilateral investment 
treaty between the U.S. and Ecuador (BIT). This Comment argues that 
the Tribunal’s interpretation of the BIT was the most reflective of the in-
vestor’s expectations and thus encouraged further investment. As incen-
tivizing this investment is the very purpose of the BIT, the Tribunal 
reached the best possible conclusion as to its meaning. 
Introduction 
 On March 30, 2010, the Tribunal established under the arbitration 
rules of UNCITRAL decided Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, which settled sev-
eral long-standing disputes between Texaco—a subsidiary of Chev-
ron1—and Ecuador.2 The arbitration concerned seven cases filed by 
Texaco against Ecuador when Texaco’s two-decade contract for certain 
oil-related rights in Ecuador expired in 1992.3 By the time Chevron 
commenced this arbitration, six of the seven cases in question had sat 
 
* Jason Burke is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Re-
view. 
1 Texaco initially filed the cases at issue in this arbitration against Ecuador; Chevron sub-
sequently acquired Texaco and is now claiming this arbitration through its subsidiary. Chev-
ron Corp. v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award on the Merits, ¶¶ 134, 342 (Mar. 
30, 2010), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ChevronTexacoEcuadorPartialAward.PDF. 
2 See id. 
3 Id. ¶¶ 133–134. 
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dormant for between thirteen and fifteen years with little action by the 
Ecuadorian judiciary.4 An Ecuadorian court dismissed the last case for 
abandonment, but another Ecuadorian court subsequently overturned 
the dismissal.5 
 Against this background, the Tribunal found that, by the time the 
action was commenced in December of 2006, Ecuador had violated the 
BIT by causing undue delay in Texaco’s Ecuadorian legal proceedings.6 
The Tribunal went on to dismiss Ecuador’s contention that Chevron 
was precluded from bringing this arbitration because Texaco and Che-
vron had failed to exhaust every domestic legal remedy.7 Ultimately, the 
Tribunal awarded Chevron $698,621,904.84 in damages.8 The judg-
ment was met with swift criticism from Ecuador’s attorney general who 
stated that “‘[t]his new effort to compromise the Ecuadorean state in 
its firm commitment to respect the independence of its judicial system 
. . . will not succeed.’”9 
 Part I of this Comment discusses the origins of the disputes that 
led to the Chevron case and the Interim Award regarding the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction. Part II discusses the traditional formulation of denial of 
justice under customary international law and compares it to the stan-
dard created by the Tribunal in this case. Part III argues that the Tri-
bunal arrived at the correct decision by heavily utilizing the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) to craft a stan-
dard that was extremely faithful to the text of the BIT, thus avoiding the 
type of uncertainty that chills investment. 
I. Background 
A. Texaco’s Operations in Ecuador and Related Lawsuits 
 Relations between the parties in the case commenced in 1964 
when Ecuador gave certain rights related to the exploration and pro-
duction of oil to Texaco.10 In 1973, the 1964 agreement was replaced 
by a new agreement (1973 Agreement), which granted Texaco explora-
                                                                                                                      
4 Id. ¶ 270. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 See Chevron, UNCITRAL Arbitration, ¶¶ 329–331. 
8 See id. ¶¶ 546–550. 
9 See Ecuador Rejects Ruling Awarding $700m to Chevron, Bloomberg Businessweek 
(Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9EPOS7O0.htm. 
10 Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award on the Merits, ¶ 125 
(Mar. 30, 2010), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ChevronTexacoEcuadorPartialAward.PDF. 
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tion and drilling rights in Ecuador’s Amazon region, so long as Texaco 
provided for Ecuador’s domestic oil needs at a lower price to be set by 
the nation.11 In 1987, an earthquake shook Ecuador and seriously dis-
rupted Texaco’s ability to deliver enough oil to satisfy domestic needs, 
forcing Ecuador to seek out alternate sources of oil and pay more than 
the agreed-upon domestic price.12 Ecuador later would demand that 
Texaco provide it with many extra barrels of crude oil at the lower 
agreed-upon price to compensate its government for the oil bought at 
a higher price during the crisis.13 
 Efforts to negotiate an extension of Texaco’s rights to explore and 
exploit oil in Ecuador failed and in 1992, the 1973 Agreement ex-
pired.14 In this time frame, between 1991 and 1993, Texaco filed the 
seven claims at issue in this case against Ecuador.15 Five of these cases 
claimed that Ecuador had overstated its domestic needs, taking more 
oil than it was entitled to at the low domestic price.16 Another case in-
volved a force majeure17 issue related to the 1987 earthquake.18 The final 
claim regarded a violation of a refinancing agreement that had been 
signed between the two parties in 1986.19 Texaco filed all of these cases 
between 1991 and 1993.20 A decade later, Ecuadorian politics entered a 
period of crisis, during which the nation’s judicial system experienced 
profound instability.21 During this period, these seven cases sat mostly 
dormant despite numerous inquiries by Texaco (and Chevron, after it 
acquired Texaco).22 
B. Filing for Arbitration and the 2008 Interim Award 
 With little progress on its claims for over a decade, Chevron com-
menced arbitration in a UNCITRAL tribunal in December of 2006.23 
The BIT, which entered into force in 1997, specifies the rights that each 
                                                                                                                      
11 Id. ¶¶ 127–128. 
12 See id. ¶¶ 130–131. 
13 Id. ¶ 132. 
14 See id. ¶ 133. 
15 See id. ¶ 134. 
16 Chevron, UNCITRAL Arbitration, ¶ 135. 
17 Force majeure is “[a]n event or effect that can be neither anticipated nor controlled. 
The term includes both acts of nature (e.g., floods and hurricanes) and acts of people 
(e.g., riots, strikes, and wars).” Black’s Law Dictionary 718 (9th ed. 2009). 
18 Chevron, UNCITRAL Arbitration, ¶ 135. 
19 Id. 
20 See id. ¶ 149 (Table 1). 
21 See id. ¶ 142–143. 
22 See id. ¶¶ 255, 270. 
23 See id. ¶ 145. 
466 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 34:463 
nation shall accord to foreign investors from the other.24 Further, the 
BIT specifies that an action questioning a breach of the treaty could be 
commenced in an UNCITRAL tribunal.25 At the jurisdictional phase of 
this arbitration, Ecuador argued that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to 
hear the claim for a variety of reasons.26 First, Ecuador cited statements 
made by Chevron and Texaco in a U.S. court action, in which the cor-
porations stated that Ecuador’s judiciary was fair and competent.27 Ec-
uador argued that Chevron should not be allowed to contradict itself 
and claim that Ecuadorian courts were incompetent to decide the cases 
at issue in this arbitration.28 Second, Ecuador claimed that the cases in 
dispute did not concern “investment” as defined by the BIT.29 Third, 
Ecuador argued that this claim was not ripe for adjudication as Chev-
ron failed to exhaust all domestic remedies.30 Finally, Ecuador claimed 
that the events giving rise to the claims took place before May 11, 1997, 
the date on which the BIT came into effect, thus making the BIT inap-
plicable.31 On December 1, 2008, the Tribunal rejected Ecuador’s con-
tentions about the Tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction and allowed the case 
to proceed to the merits phase.32 
II. Discussion 
A. Denial of Justice Under Customary International Law 
 That states have a “duty to provide decent justice to foreigners” is 
one of the oldest precepts of international law.33 A claim of “denial of 
justice” has long existed as a way for foreigners to vindicate this right.34 
Though it is widely accepted as a cause of action in international law, 
the exact definition of the term has been debated throughout the last 
                                                                                                                      
24 See generally Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecua-
dor Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-
Ecuador, Aug. 27, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103–15 (1993) [hereinafter Investment Trea-
ty]. 
25 See id. art. VI(3)(a). 
26 Chevron, UNCITRAL Arbitration, ¶ 9. 
27 See id. ¶ 10. 
28 Id. 
29 See id. ¶ 12. 
30 See id. ¶ 13. 
31 Id. ¶ 15. 
32 Chevron, UNCITRAL Arbitration, ¶ 25. 
33 Jan Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law 1 (2005). 
34 See id. 
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century.35 Much of this debate is related to the fact that the term “de-
nial of justice” has intentionally been kept a broad and abstract con-
cept.36 Moving towards the other extreme, a bright-line rule would al-
low states to get away with treating foreigners poorly by conforming to 
legal formalities.37 
 Nevertheless, the most basic formulation of a standard denial of 
justice claim has been articulated by scholars with relative consistency.38 
Responsibility for denial of justice will attach to a state actor only where 
“the factual circumstances” are “egregious.”39 Many scholars have his-
torically argued that state actors can be held accountable for denial of 
justice where the actions of the judiciary are “‘grossly unfair’ or ‘mani-
festly unjust.’”40 Yet the question of what constitutes a “manifestly un-
just” judgment is subject to considerable debate.41 Two other categories 
of denial of justice—the refusal to allow foreigners to assert their rights 
before domestic courts and judicial delays that are “equivalent to re-
fusal” —are, however, firmly accepted by a majority of international law-
yers.42 Under customary international law, the foreigner seeking re-
dress for denial of justice must also prove that she has exhausted all 
local remedies.43 Thus, a denial of justice claim will usually be based on 
an allegedly unjust final decision of the nation’s highest appeals court, 
                                                                                                                      
35 See Alwyn V. Freeman, The International Responsibility of States for Denial 
of Justice, 96–97 (Kraus Reprint Co. 1970) (1938) (listing six varying definitions of denial 
of justice); Paulsson, supra note 33, at 65 (stating that “two centuries of debate have fo-
cused on” what makes a decision sufficiently “‘manifestly unjust and one-sided’” to amount 
to a denial of justice); Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Meaning of the Term “Denial of Justice”, 13 
Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 93, 93 (1932) (noting that many possible definitions of denial of justice 
have been used). 
36 See Paulsson, supra note 33, at 59 n.2. 
37 See id. at 59–60. 
38 See J.W. Garner, International Responsibility of States for Judgments of Courts and Verdicts of 
Juries Amounting to Denial of Justice, 10 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 181, 183–84 (1929) (“[A] draft 
formulated by an American Committee of jurists in 1928 defines denial of justice for which 
the state is responsible as including the denial, delay, or exceptional difficulty of access to 
the courts, gross deficiencies in the judicial or remedial process, the absence of those 
guarantees which are indispensable to the proper administration of justice, or a ‘manifestly 
unjust’ judgment.”); see also Paulsson, supra note 33, at 65 (citing Vattel with approval, 
who in 1758 proposed a three-tier definition of denial of justice, including: (1) “not admit-
ting foreigners to establish their rights before the ordinary courts”; (2) “delays which are 
ruinous or otherwise equivalent to refusal”; and (3) “judgments [that are] ‘manifestly un-
just and one-sided’”). 
39 Paulsson, supra note 33, at 60. 
40 See Garner, supra note 38, at 183. 
41 See Paulsson, supra note 33, at 65. 
42 Id. 
43 See id. at 100. 
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which illustrates that the entire justice system has failed to adequately 
protect the rights of the foreigner.44 
 Chevron initiated its claim partly upon this customary interna-
tional law concept of denial of justice.45 As a primary matter, Chevron 
argued that Ecuador had violated customary international law and 
committed a denial of justice by means of an undue delay in the court 
cases it filed against Ecuador that were pending for over a decade.46 By 
proving that Ecuador violated customary international law, Chevron 
asserted that it also proved a violation of the BIT,47 which states that 
“[i]nvestment . . . shall in no case be accorded treatment less than that 
required by international law.”48 In the alternative, Chevron argued 
that the decisions rendered after the commencement of the action by 
Ecuador’s courts were so manifestly unjust as to amount to a denial of 
justice.49 As a final matter, Chevron insisted that exhaustion of local 
remedies was not a requirement under customary international law,50 
but even if it were a requirement, it would be fulfilled in this case.51 
 Ecuador, for its part, emphasized the high burden that the plaintiff 
carries in an action for denial of justice.52 According to Ecuador, a de-
nial of justice claim based upon undue delay must assert that the state’s 
delay amounted to a “refusal to judge,”53 which Ecuador contended 
that Chevron had not done.54 In response to Chevron’s alternative ar-
gument alleging a denial of justice based on manifestly unjust deci-
sions, Ecuador claimed that the decisions were not unjust, and even if 
they were, they did not reflect a high enough level of judicial impropri-
ety to breach international law and thereby invoke international arbi-
tration.55 Finally, Ecuador insisted that Chevron had not exhausted all 
domestic remedies, as most of the cases had not been appealed to the 
highest court.56 Despite the robust corpus of customary international 
                                                                                                                      
44 See id. at 100–01. 
45 See Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award on the Merits, 
¶¶ 167–169, 188, 277 (Mar. 30, 2010), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ChevronTexaco 
EcuadorPartialAward.PDF. 
46 See id. ¶¶ 167–171. 
47 Id. ¶ 167. 
48 Investment Treaty, supra note 24, art. II(3)(a). 
49 Chevron, UNCITRAL Arbitration, ¶ 188. 
50 Id. ¶ 277. 
51 See id. ¶ 279. 
52 Id. ¶ 178. 
53 Id. ¶ 180. 
54 See id. ¶ 181. 
55 See Chevron, UNCITRAL Arbitration, ¶ 195. 
56 See id. ¶¶ 295–297. 
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law concerning denial of justice that both parties cited as central to 
their arguments, the Tribunal’s opinion proceeded in quite a different 
direction.57 
B. A Lower Standard for U.S.-Ecuador Relations:  
The BIT’s Distinct Standard 
 Even though the customary international law framework discussed 
above informed the Tribunal’s decision, the Tribunal noted that its job 
was to interpret the BIT according to the rules set forth in the Vienna 
Convention.58 As such, the Tribunal used a great deal of the opinion to 
interpret the text of Article II(7) of the BIT,59 which requires that 
“[e]ach Party shall provide effective means of asserting claims and en-
forcing rights with respect to investment, investment agreements, and 
investment authorizations.”60 
 Though the Tribunal observed that the obligations imposed by 
Article II(7) are similar to those imposed by customary international 
law,61 it found that the standard set by the BIT was distinct from the 
standard for finding a denial of justice under customary international 
law.62 Indeed, the Tribunal observed that the standard necessary for 
finding a breach of the BIT could be lower than that set by customary 
international law.63 
 Thus, rather than having to prove that the state’s judicial shortcom-
ing was “egregious,” as is the general standard under customary interna-
tional law,64 the claimant must only prove that the state failed to provide 
an “effective means” for enforcing rights and bringing claims.65 Specifi-
cally, the Tribunal noted that the standard for finding a denial of justice 
under customary international law “requires the demonstration of ‘a 
particularly serious shortcoming’ and egregious conduct that ‘shocks, or 
at least surprises, a sense of judicial propriety.’”66 By contrast, the Tribu-
nal held that “under Article II(7), a failure of domestic courts to enforce 
                                                                                                                      
57 See id. ¶ 242. 
58 See id. ¶¶ 158–159, 244. 
59 See id. ¶¶ 241–275, 321–332. 
60 Investment Treaty, supra note 24, art. II(7). 
61 See Chevron, UNCITRAL Arbitration, ¶ 244. 
62 See id. ¶¶ 242–244. 
63 See id. ¶ 244. 
64 See Paulsson, supra note 33, at 60. 
65 See Chevron, UNCITRAL Arbitration, ¶ 244. 
66 Id. (quoting Opinion of Jan Paulsson, para. 10 (Nov. 2008) and Respondent’s Coun-
ter-Memorial on the Merits of Sept. 22, 2008). 
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rights ‘effectively’ will constitute a violation of Article II(7).”67 As to the 
relationship between the two standards, the Tribunal notes that judicial 
misconduct that violates Article II(7) “may not always be sufficient to 
find a denial of justice under customary international law.”68 The Tri-
bunal’s decision, therefore, creates a standard that is distinct from—and 
seemingly easier to violate than—the traditional standard.69 
 Moreover, the Tribunal decided that although a party must have 
exhausted local remedies in order to prove a denial of justice under 
customary international law, Article II(7) once again creates a distinct 
standard in this regard.70 The Tribunal was convinced that exhaustion 
of local remedies was a general requirement under customary interna-
tional law.71 In contrast, the central issue under Article II(7) is whether 
the state has provided the claimant with an effective means for enforc-
ing rights.72 The Tribunal found that only “a qualified requirement of 
exhaustion of local remedies applies under the ‘effective means’ stan-
dard of Article II(7).”73 If the respondent state can prove that valid lo-
cal remedies did exist and were not pursued, a claimant’s contention 
that it was not provided with effective means for enforcing its rights 
may be defeated.74 Nevertheless, proof of exhaustion of local remedies 
is not necessary to make a prima facie case for a breach of Article II(7).75 
 Proceeding with an analysis of the case under this legal framework, 
the Tribunal found that an undue delay serves to violate the new stan-
dard, as Article II(7) mandates that Ecuador “provide foreign investors 
with means of enforcing legitimate rights within a reasonable amount of 
time.”76 Although Ecuador highlighted various legal options not used by 
Chevron, the Tribunal was ultimately convinced that such options 
would have been ineffective and thus dismissed Ecuador’s defense.77 
After considering and dismissing a variety of factors that could have 
justified a delay,78 the Tribunal ruled that Ecuador’s long period of in-
action constituted an undue delay, in violation of Article II(7).79 
                                                                                                                      
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 See id. ¶¶ 242–244. 
70 See id. ¶ 321. 
71 Chevron, UNCITRAL Arbitration, ¶ 321. 
72 See id. ¶¶ 244, 322–324. 
73 Id. ¶ 323. 
74 See id. ¶¶ 328–329. 
75 See id. ¶ 326. 
76 Id. ¶ 250 (emphasis added). 
77 See Chevron, UNCITRAL Arbitration, ¶¶ 330–331. 
78 See id. ¶¶ 254–255, 263–265. 
79 Id. ¶ 270. 
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III. Analysis 
 The Tribunal was correct to use the Vienna Convention to carve 
out a standard that was distinct from the customary international law 
standard because such an interpretation of the BIT is the most predict-
able.80 Such predictability best promotes investment.81 Bilateral invest-
ment treaties have flourished as a way to give investors the certainty and 
security they seek when investing abroad.82 Interpretations of bilateral 
investment treaties that create uncertainty for investors may serve to 
chill investment,83 which such treaties were often meant to promote.84 
Ultimately, in the instant case, Chevron’s expectations of its own rights 
under the BIT were based heavily on an interpretation informed by the 
Vienna Convention.85 Thus, by strictly applying the Vienna Convention 
to its analysis of the BIT,86 the Tribunal promoted certainty and security 
for American investors like Chevron in Ecuador.87 Any other interpre-
tation would have created uncertainty about the rights guaranteed to 
investors by the BIT,88 thus chilling investment and contravening the 
paramount goal of the BIT itself.89 
                                                                                                                      
 
80 See Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award on the Merits, 
¶¶ 159, 161–162, 242–244 (Mar. 30, 2010), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ChevronTex- 
acoEcuadorPartialAward.PDF (stating that both parties relied on the Vienna Convention in 
making their arguments regarding the substantive provisions of the BIT, explaining that 
the Tribunal actually applied the Vienna Convention to interpret the BIT, and ultimately 
creating a standard distinct from the international law standard). 
81 See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing 
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1521, 1538, 1558 
(2005) (arguing that increasing investors’ confidence in their ability to enforce rights un-
der bilateral investment treaties promotes foreign investment and asserting that inconsis-
tency in the interpretation of bilateral investment treaties creates uncertainty about and 
damages expectations of the rights afforded by such a treaty). 
82 See Jarrod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of Contract, 
Treaty Violations, and the Divide Between Developing and Developed Countries in Foreign Investment 
Disputes, 14 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 135, 135–36 (2006). 
83 See id. at 139 (“Allowing the host State to renege on its agreement in the BIT creates 
uncertainty in the global marketplace and can serve only to discourage foreign invest-
ment.”). 
84 See id. at 135 (“The BIT serves to attract foreign investment by granting broad in-
vestment rights to investors and creating flexibility in the resolution of investment dis-
putes.”). 
85 See Chevron, UNCITRAL Arbitration, ¶ 159. 
86 See id. ¶¶ 161–162. 
87 Cf. Franck, supra note 81, at 1558 (claiming that inconsistent interpretations of bi-
lateral investment treaties decrease certainty about the rights guaranteed by the treaty, 
thereby damaging investors’ expectations). 
88 See id. 
89 See Investment Treaty, supra note 24, pmbl. (stating that the United States and Ecua-
dor entered into the BIT “desiring to promote greater economic cooperation between 
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 In a globalized world with increasing amounts of investment flow-
ing across national borders, parties looking to invest in foreign nations 
seek increasing amounts of security.90 To this end, many nations have 
sought to guarantee expansive protection to investors by entering into 
bilateral investment treaties.91 These treaties “govern[] the treatment of 
investments made in the territory of each state by individuals or compa-
nies from the other state.”92 These investment treaties have proliferated, 
particularly between 1994 and 2006, by which time there were approxi-
mately 2400 bilateral investment treaties between various nations.93 
 Given that the increasingly popular use of bilateral investment 
treaties has at its core the goal of securing foreign investment,94 inter-
pretations that create uncertainty about the rights enshrined in such 
treaties ultimately discourage investment.95 Jarrod Wong, a former le-
gal adviser at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, in talking about the “um-
brella clause”96 of certain bilateral investment treaties, highlights sev-
eral arbitral decisions that he argues were under-protective of 
investment because they failed to faithfully interpret the text of the re-
levant treaties.97 Wong argues that a failure to interpret an “umbrella 
clause” in accordance with its text and history allows host states to re-
nege on their responsibilities under bilateral investment treaties, creat-
ing uncertainty for investors from which foreign investment will suf-
r.98
presses concern about the deleterious effects of interpretive uncertainty 
                                                                                                                     
fe  
 Similarly, in an article addressing a number of inconsistent arbitral 
decisions arising out of bilateral investment treaties, Susan D. Franck, a 
practitioner and professor of international arbitration law, also ex-
 
them, with respect to reinvestment by nationals and companies of one Party in the terri-
tory of the other Party” and “recognizing that agreement upon the treatment to be ac-
corded such investment will stimulate the flow of private capital and the economic devel-
opment of the Parties”); Wong, supra note 82, at 139. 
90 See Franck, supra note 81, at 1525. 
91 See Wong, supra note 82, at 135–36. 
92 Id. at 141. 
93 See id. at 135–36. 
94 See id. 
95 See id. at 139. 
96 An “umbrella clause” is a clause that “imposes a requirement on each Contracting 
State to observe all investment obligations entered into with investors from the other Con-
tracting State.” Id. at 136. Liberally interpreted, such a clause allows an arbitration tribunal 
interpreting a bilateral investment treaty to exercise “jurisdiction over breach-of-contract 
claims since a breach of the investment contract is also a breach of the umbrella clause.” 
See Wong, supra note 82, at 137. 
97 See id. 
98 See id. at 139. 
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on foreign investment.99 She states that “[i]nconsistency creates uncer-
tainty and damages the legitimate expectations of investors and Sover-
eigns.”100 Franck notes that one main effect of bilateral investment trea-
ties is to increase investment incentives by granting rights to investors 
and thus reducing the risks associated with investment; it logically fol-
lows that throwing such rights into doubt will increase risk and thereby 
stifle investment.101 
 The interpretation of the BIT at issue in Chevron that best encour-
ages investment is one that protects the expectations of investors by ap-
plying the source widely accepted as an accurate statement of customary 
international law on treaty interpretation—the Vienna Convention.102 
Such an interpretation is the least likely to create the type of confusion 
that would chill the very investment that a bilateral investment treaty is 
designed to ensure.103 To that end, the Tribunal noted that Chevron 
firmly accepted that the correct way to interpret the BIT was by using 
the Vienna Convention, which reflects customary international law with 
regard to treaty interpretation.104 Therefore, an interpretation of the 
BIT based firmly in the Vienna Convention would be most reflective of 
the investor’s expectations and therefore most likely to create the de-
sired certainty and investment.105 
 The Tribunal found that the relevant provisions of the Vienna 
Convention with regard to treaty interpretation are Articles 31 and 
32.106 First, Article 31 states that a treaty should be “interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and pur-
pose.”107 As stated by the Tribunal, the explicit refusal to include cus-
tomary international law as the standard for finding a breach of the 
BIT meant that there was a different standard.108 Indeed, the “effective 
means” standard created by the court is exceptionally consistent with 
this interpretive tenet in that it specifically uses the words of the BIT 
                                                                                                                      
99 See Franck, supra note 81, at 1558. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 1538. 
102 See Chevron, UNCITRAL Arbitration, ¶ 159; Franck, supra note 81, at 1538, 1558. 
103 See Wong, supra note 82, at 135, 139. 
104 See Chevron, UNCITRAL Arbitration, ¶ 159. 
105 See id.; Franck, supra note 81, at 1538. 
106 See Chevron, UNCITRAL Arbitration, ¶¶ 161–162. 
107 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
108 Chevron, UNCITRAL Arbitration, ¶ 242. 
474 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 34:463 
itself.109 Further, Article 32 of the Vienna Convention allows a tribunal 
to consider other factors—such as the “preparatory work of the treaty 
and the circumstances of its conclusion” —but only to confirm the 
meaning dictated by Article 31.110 Applying Article 32, the Tribunal 
noted that this BIT was drafted at a time when the United States 
deemed more specific protection for investors to be desirable, thus 
confirming the “effective means” standard mandated by Article 31.111 
Ultimately, the Tribunal’s interpretation of the BIT was remarkably 
consistent with the Vienna Convention.112 As Chevron had based its 
arguments around the Vienna Convention, this interpretation most 
closely reflected its expectations.113 Ultimately, this interpretation pro-
moted the most possible certainty for potential future investors.114 
Conclusion 
 The concept of denial of justice is not a new one under customary 
international law. Indeed, decades of scholarship have coalesced around 
a general theory that, to amount to a denial of justice, judicial miscon-
duct must be egregious. Moreover, a party claiming to be a victim of de-
nial of justice must prove that it has exhausted all local remedies. In 
Chevron, however, the Tribunal found that while the customary interna-
tional law standard of denial of justice was influential, it was not deter-
minative, as the job of the Tribunal was to interpret the BIT. As such, the 
Tribunal found that Article II(7) set forth a distinct “effective means” 
standard, which was less demanding than customary international law 
with regard to proving denial of justice and exhaustion of local reme-
dies. This less demanding standard is preferential because the Tribunal 
strictly applied the Vienna Convention to create a faithful, text-based 
interpretation of the BIT. Because the Vienna Convention had in-
                                                                                                                      
109 See Investment Treaty, supra note 24, art. II(7) (“Each party shall provide effective means 
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and investment authorizations.”) (emphasis added); Vienna Convention, supra note 107, art. 
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pose.”); Chevron, UNCITRAL Arbitration, ¶ 242 (“The Tribunal thus finds that Article II(7), 
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of the law on denial of justice.”). 
110 Vienna Convention, supra note 107, art. 32. 
111 See Chevron, UNCITRAL Arbitration, ¶ 243. 
112 See Vienna Convention, supra note 107, arts. 31–32; Chevron, UNCITRAL Arbitration, 
¶¶ 242–244. 
113 See Chevron, UNCITRAL Arbitration, ¶ 159. 
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formed Chevron’s interpretation of the BIT and its rights as an investor, 
the Tribunal ultimately confirmed Chevron’s expectations and avoided 
creating the type of interpretive uncertainty that can chill the very in-
vestment that the BIT was meant to foster. Such an approach for future 
Tribunals interpreting the BIT would further increase certainty for in-
vestors and incentivize U.S. investment in Ecuador. 
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